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The paper shows that US monetary policy has been an important determinant of global equity 
markets. Analysing 50 equity markets worldwide, we find that returns fall on average around 
3.8% in response to a 100 basis point tightening of US monetary policy, ranging from a zero 
response in some to a reaction of 10% or more in other countries, as well as significant cross-
sector heterogeneity. Distinguishing different transmission channels, we find that in particular 
the transmission via US and foreign short-term interest rates and the exchange rate play an 
important role. As to the determinants of the strength of transmission to individual countries, 
we test the relevance of their macroeconomic policies and the degree of real and financial 
integration, thus linking the strength of asset price transmission to underlying trade and asset 
holdings, and find that in particular the degree of global integration of countries – and not a 
country’s bilateral integration with the United States – is a key determinant for the 
transmission process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a strong notion that financial markets have become increasingly globally 
integrated over the past decade. One important facet of financial integration is that 
asset prices exhibit substantial co-movements internationally. The nature of this 
integration and the transmission channels through which shocks dissipate are, 
however, still not well understood. What are the factors that cause such a co-
movement? Are they global in nature or can they be traced to specific developments 
in individual countries and sectors? The difficulty researchers face in answering these 
questions is often a lack of identification; since asset prices – both domestically and 
internationally – are determined simultaneously, it is hard to trace the origin of 
financial market developments to a single country or event. 
 
A key element of financial markets is the role of monetary policy as a driver of global 
asset prices. The paper uses the transmission of US monetary policy shocks in order 
to understand global linkages among asset prices and financial markets. Specifically, 
we look at the transmission of US monetary policy shocks to 50 equity markets 
worldwide, covering not only advanced economies but all of the major emerging 
market economies, over the period 1994-2004. For identification of monetary policy 
shocks, we use the reaction of Federal funds future rates to Federal Reserve policy 
decisions on FOMC meeting days. These are the unexpected components of FOMC 
decisions, in a 30-minute window around the announcement of the FOMC decisions, 
and thus can be identified as exogenous shocks to global financial markets. 
 
This approach allows us to address two related issues. First, we identify the overall 
strength of the transmission of US monetary policy shocks to equity markets and find 
that global equity markets fall by around 3.8% in response to a 100 basis point (bp) 
tightening of US monetary policy. Equally importantly, we show that there is a 
substantial degree of heterogeneity in the reaction across countries and across industry 
sectors. Some markets fall by more than 10% due to a 100 bp tightening, thus reacting 
even more strongly than the US equity market itself, while other countries’ stock 
markets do not react at all to US monetary policy shocks. Moreover, we detect a 
substantial degree of sector heterogeneity, ranging from a 7.4% response of the 
information technology sector to 1.6% for the utilities sector. 
 
As to the second issue, we try to identify the transmission channels of US monetary 
policy shocks and distinguish between two separate channels. For the first channel, 
we show that the strength of the financial transmission depends on the response of US 
asset prices – in particular US short-term interest rates – to US monetary policy. The 
shock transmission to global equity markets is found to be three times larger when US 
short-term interest rates exhibit a high sensitivity to US monetary policy shocks. The 
transmission is also significantly larger when US equity markets react more strongly 
to US monetary policy shocks, but it appears to be unrelated to the reaction of US 
long-term interest rates. For the second channel, we find that the financial 
transmission occurs to a substantial degree through foreign asset prices, in particular 
exchange rates and the reaction of foreign short-term interest rates. Countries that 
experience a relatively large sensitivity of both their exchange rate and their short-
term interest rate to US monetary policy shocks face a two to three times larger 
response in their equity returns. 
   3
Having identified the channels of transmission, we then proceed to study their 
determinants by explaining the differential effects across countries and over time 
through macroeconomic policies and the degree of real and financial integration of 
countries. Countries with open and well developed equity markets and financial 
sectors react significantly more to US monetary policy shocks than closed ones, as do 
countries with more volatile exchange rates. However, we find no evidence that 
countries with fixed or with floating exchange rate regimes react differently to US 
monetary policy shocks. This difference in the responses between de jure versus de 
facto exchange rate regimes may be explained through a fear of floating argument, i.e. 
the fact that de jure exchange rate regimes are rather imprecise, in particular for 
emerging markets, in describing the true actions of central banks with regard to 
exchange rate policy. 
 
Finally, we find that the nature and degree of real and financial integration is a key 
determinant for the transmission of US monetary policy shocks. Our database to test 
for financial integration is unique in that it contains holdings of capital stocks vis-à-
vis the United States as well as the rest of the world for all elements of the capital 
account – FDI, portfolio equity investment, portfolio debt investment and loans. Thus 
this database allows us to conduct a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the role 
in particular of financial integration. We find that stock markets in countries that hold 
a large amount of foreign financial assets (relative to domestic GDP) and also that 
owe a large amount of domestic financial assets to foreigners react two to three times 
more strongly to monetary policy shocks than less financially integrated countries. 
We show that this holds quite independently of which type of capital is concerned – 
countries that are more financially integrated either with regard to FDI, portfolio 
equity investment, portfolio debt investment or with regard to loans all face an equity 
market response that is at least twice as strong as that of less financially integrated 
countries. A key finding of the paper is that it is in particular the degree of global 
integration, i.e. integration of individual countries vis-à-vis all other countries, rather 
than the degree of bilateral integration with the United States that determines the 
magnitude of transmission. This underlines the complexity of the channels of the 
global financial transmission process. It also has important implications for portfolio 
diversification and risk-sharing through global capital markets. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature 
and formulates our main hypotheses. The data is described in section 3. Section 4 
discusses the empirical methodology employed and presents the benchmark results for 
the financial transmission process, distinguishing also between the cross-sectional 
heterogeneity across countries and across sectors. The findings for the role of the two 
transmission channels are discussed in section 5. Section 6 contains the analysis of the 
macroeconomic determinants of the strength of transmission, together with several 
robustness tests of the empirical results. Section 7 summarises the findings and 
concludes by drawing some implications for policy and future work. 
 
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis formulation 
 
The paper focuses on the intersection between and attempts to link two strands of the 
literature on asset market linkages: first, the literature on domestic financial market 
effects of monetary policy (section 2.1), and second, the literature on international   4
asset market linkages (section 2.2). It also builds on the literature that tries to explain 
individual elements of financial linkages and the transmission process (section 2.3). 
 
2.1  Monetary policy and equity markets 
 
The effect of monetary policy on equity markets has been the subject of a long-
standing literature, which has received renewed interest in recent years. The topic has 
attracted considerable attention, on the one hand, because monetary policy can 
substantially affect stock market valuation, and as such is considered important from a 
finance perspective, and on the other hand, because the stock market is a central part 
of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, and as such is of relevance to 
monetary economists. A monetary policy shock affects firm investment through its 
influence on Tobin’s q, which can most conveniently be studied through the response 
of stock prices to this shock. At the same time, stock price reactions have 
repercussions on consumer behaviour through wealth effects.  
 
While considered an important topic of analysis, estimates of the strength of the effect 
have been complicated by a problem of identification, since monetary policy may be 
endogenous in that central banks might react to developments in stock markets. 
Various approaches have been followed to address this issue. For instance, a number 
of studies have resorted to identified monetary policy shocks in the context of VAR 
models. Thorbecke (1997), for instance, finds that stock returns are responsive to 
monetary policy shocks in the United States, and that there are substantial differences 
in the response across industries and across firms of different size. Patelis (1997) 
arrives at very similar results, but also shows that the overall explanatory power of 
monetary policy for stock returns is rather low.  
 
As an alternative approach to identification, several papers have conducted event 
studies. This allows an analysis at higher frequency compared to the VAR literature 
which is mostly based on quarterly or monthly data. For instance, Thorbecke (1997) 
also uses an event study at daily frequency, and shows that US equity markets react 
significantly to changes in the federal funds rate. Jensen and Johnson (1995) show 
that there are also longer-term effects of changes in the discount rate, in the sense that 
stock returns following discount rate decreases are higher and less volatile than 
returns following rate increases for several weeks. Bomfim (2001) finds evidence for 
low volatility in US stock markets on days preceding regularly scheduled policy 
announcements, whereas policy decisions increase stock market volatility. 
Furthermore, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find that the effect of US monetary policy 
on US equity returns is hardly related to real interest rates, but mainly to the effect of 
US monetary policy on expected future excess returns and expected future dividends. 
 
The renewed recent interest in the topic can be ascribed to new tools in the 
identification of monetary policy surprises. Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004) develop a 
methodology that exploits the heteroskedasticity present in financial markets to 
identify monetary policy shocks, while Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) use market 
expectations as measured by polls among market participants. Finally, Kuttner (2001) 
and Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) derive monetary policy shocks through 
measures of market expectations obtained from federal funds futures contracts. 
Overall, there is now a robust conclusion in the literature that monetary policy affects 
domestic stock markets – not only by altering volatility, but also through its effects on   5
the mean of stock returns. The decline of US stock markets to a 100 bp tightening in 
the federal funds target rate is estimated at 5.3% by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), at 
5.5% by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) and at 6.2% by Rigobon and Sack (2004). 
 
The primary focus of the literature on stock market effects of monetary policy has 
been a domestic one. To our knowledge, there are only few exceptions studying the 
effect of monetary policy in an international context. Conover, Jensen and Johnson 
(1999) look at 16 industrialized countries and find that equity markets in several of 
these react to what they label the US “monetary environment”. Their analysis is based 
on monthly data, and they define a monetary environment to be expansive or 
restrictive dependent on the direction of the most recent change in discount rates. 
Stock returns are generally higher in expansive than in restrictive US environments. 
Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon (2005) estimate effects of monetary policy on stock 
markets for the euro area and the United States. They find that euro area stock 
markets drop by nearly 2% in response to a 100 bp tightening in the United States on 
the same day. By contrast, euro area monetary policy affects US stock markets to a 
much smaller extent, at 0.5%. 
 
2.2  International financial market linkages 
 
This paper also relates to the strand of literature that has analysed cross-country asset 
market linkages. Equity markets, the focus of this paper, have been studied in a large 
number of contributions. Again, the main difficulty in estimating market linkages is 
one of identification. Whereas there is clear evidence for positive correlation in stock 
markets, identifying the causal links is much more difficult. King and Wadhwani 
(1990) argue that correlation between markets occurs as rational agents try to infer 
information from price changes in other markets. In an attempt to explain the time 
variation in stock market correlations, King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994) analyse 
volatility spillovers between sixteen national stock markets, and find that changes in 
correlations between markets are driven mainly by changes in unobservable variables.  
 
One possibility to identify directional causality in stock market linkages is to exploit 
differences in trading times. Using this device, Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990) find 
evidence of volatility spillovers from the US to Japan and the UK, as well as from the 
UK to Japan, but not in the other directions. Extending the focus from pure volatility 
spillovers to mean returns, Lin, Engle and Ito (1994) show that the returns of US and 
Japanese markets are interrelated, with effects going in both directions.  
 
Finally, an alternative identification scheme is to study the effects of particular news. 
Becker, Finnerty and Friedman (1995) show that spillovers between the US and UK 
stock markets are in part due to US news and information. In a similar vein, Andersen 
et al. (2005) show that US, German and British stock markets react to US 
macroeconomic news. Wongswan (2003) finds that macroeconomic announcements 
in the US and Japan affect equity markets in Korea and Thailand. However, Connolly 
and Wang (2003) argue that such macroeconomic news can explain only a small share 
of the equity market spillovers between mature economies.  
 
Overall, the literature has provided clear and robust evidence for international equity 
market linkages. In the search for causality, US markets in particular have been 
singled out as a main driver of global developments.   6
2.3  Explaining linkages 
 
While there is clear evidence for cross-market linkages, these are not identical across 
countries and vary over time (Bekaert and Harvey 1995). Accordingly, there have 
been attempts to explain the intensity of spillovers across countries and over time. 
Differences in industry structure are one potential explanation, whereby countries 
with more similar industrial composition should see closer co-movements (e.g., Roll 
1992). However, the importance of this factor has been debated; for instance, Heston 
and Rouwenhorst (1994) and Griffin and Karolyi (1998) argue that industrial structure 
explains very little of the differences in market volatility across countries. By contrast, 
Campbell et al. (2001) and Griffin and Stulz (2001) find that industry-specific factors 
are important in understanding international equity market comovements. 
 
The role of trade as a catalyst for market linkages has been highlighted first in 
applications to currency crises,
1 e.g. in Eichengreen and Rose (1999) or Glick and 
Rose (1999). The hypothesis of that strand of the literature is that larger trade 
integration increases also financial market linkages; for instance, a devaluation in one 
country increases temporarily its competitiveness, thus affecting adversely also its 
trade competitors. Using a common factor model, Forbes and Chinn (2004) test the 
trade channel also for non-crisis periods, and furthermore expand the potential 
determinants for international spillovers. They find both trade and financial linkages 
to be important since the mid 1990s. Furthermore, the paper shows that there are 
regional spillovers from the largest economy in a given region to nearby countries, yet 
that US developments are transmitted to all regions. 
 
Finally, some hypotheses are also tested in papers analysing the spillover from US 
monetary policy shocks to other economies in general or financial markets other than 
equity markets. Miniane and Rogers (2003) assess whether capital controls manage to 
insulate countries from US monetary shocks, by estimating their effect on the 
exchange rate and foreign interest rates. The hypothesis whether countries with less 
open capital accounts exhibit systematically smaller responses is rejected by the 
authors, however. Kim (2001), using a VAR framework with low-frequency data, 
identifies interest rate reactions in other countries as the most important channel of 
transmission. This conclusion is shared by Canova (2005), who employs a similar 
methodology and furthermore finds that the strength of countries’ response to US 
monetary policy depends on exchange rate regimes, even though differences with the 
de jure classification appear relatively small. 
 
2.4  Hypotheses and contribution 
 
The intended contribution of the present paper is to link these different strands of the 
literature in order to understand how financial markets are linked internationally. As 
we will explain in detail in the next section, we are able to use a clean identification of 
US monetary policy shocks to test for the international transmission of this shock. 
However, we are focusing on “normal” times, rather than crises, as common in the 
literature on linkages. The existing literature helps us in formulating our hypothesis 
and designing our testing framework.  
                                                 
1 These studies attempt to measure contagion rather than interdependence; see Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) for a critical assessment of the empirical methodologies generally used in this literature.   7
 
As to the transmission channels, several studies have highlighted the importance of 
the response of other asset prices than equity markets to US monetary policy shocks, 
with particular importance given to interest rate transmission. Accordingly, we will 
test whether differences in the effect of US monetary policy shocks –  i.e. the 
dispersion of these effects across countries and over time – is explained by the 
reaction of US asset prices, as well as whether they are related to the reaction of 
foreign asset prices such as interest rates and the exchange rate. We also control for 
differences in sector composition of different stock markets. As to the economic 
determinants of the transmission process, the main factors singled out in the literature 
are trade and financial linkages. In line with this, we will analyse and compare the 
role of a large number of macroeconomic and financial variables.  
 
There are both macroeconomic and microeconomic reasons why we would expect to 
see equity markets in economies other than the United States respond to US monetary 
policy. First, there are likely to be macroeconomic repercussions of a US monetary 
policy shock to foreign economies as the effects within the US might spill over to 
other countries, particularly if these have a high business cycle correlation, close trade 
links or high financial integration. Accordingly, stock markets in those economies are 
likely to be affected, too. Furthermore, there can be microeconomic effects on the 
individual firms traded in the various national stock markets that go beyond the 
general macroeconomic linkages, and effects on individual investors. These are 
mainly threefold. First, stock prices should be affected through a change in firms’ 
financing costs. This relates most directly to companies that source some of their 
funds in the US. At the same time, financing costs could be changing globally or in 
the respective country, depending on interest rate reactions at the global or country 
level. Second, stock price evaluations of companies that have some business links 
with the US will be affected through the influence of US monetary policy on real 
economic activity in the US. Third, for financial investors, a change in US interest 
rates is likely to trigger a portfolio rebalancing by local, US or global investors. All 
three factors are most likely magnified in more open economies – be it through trade 





We proceed by first outlining the data for the financial market returns, for the 
monetary policy shocks as well as for the macroeconomic variables of the 
transmission channels. In the subsequent section, we will then turn to the empirical 
methodology and modelling of the financial transmission process. 
 
3.1 Financial market data 
 
The main focus of the paper is on the transmission of US monetary policy shocks to 
foreign equity markets. A first important choice is therefore what type of equity 
indices to chose. We decided to take Datastream price indices in national currencies 
for several reasons. First, they offer a maximum amount of comparability across 
countries. Second, they are based on a broad sample of stocks, including many small 
firms in the indices. Third, the indices are available for 50 countries, covering all 
major advanced economies and major emerging market economies. Fourth, each   8
national index is furthermore available disaggregated into sector indices. Finally, the 
choice of currency implies that we are able to calculate national equity returns pure of 
exchange rate effects. Annex 1 lists the country and sector coverage of the Datastream 
indices, showing that series are mostly available for the full time sample covered. 
 
An important issue is the sector composition of the different equity markets. As 
discussed above, a potentially relevant determinant for differences in the transmission 
of shocks to equity markets may be the different sector composition of the overall 
market indices. For instance, the equity market of a particular country may react more 
to foreign shocks due to the concentration of firms of a particular sector in that index, 
rather than due to the other factors of interest here. We use two ways to control for 
such sector effects in the empirical analysis below. First, we model the transmission 
on each sector index in each country allowing for sector-specific fixed effects and 
transmission effects. Second, for the analysis of the determinants of a country’s 
response to US monetary policy shocks, we construct aggregate indices which are 
calculated as the unweighted average of the sector returns in each country. 
 
Finally, the analysis and empirical modelling is based on daily financial market data, 
using closing quotes of the respective equity markets. We choose this frequency due 
to the fact that several equity markets, i.e. those in Asia but also in Europe, are closed 
when US monetary policy decisions are announced. Hence, tomorrow’s equity returns 
for these countries are included to test the effect of a US monetary policy shock today. 
 
3.2 Monetary policy shocks 
 
The second issue is how to measure US monetary policy shocks. To obtain an as clean 
and exogenous as possible proxy for such shocks, we use the change of the Fed funds 
future rates in the 30-minute window surrounding FOMC decisions. The data stems 
from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005).
2 
 
FOMC meetings usually take place 8 times per year, about every six weeks. Starting 
in February 1994, the Federal Reserve announces its decisions on the day of the 
FOMC meetings, whereas before, markets needed to infer decisions from the open 
market operations. Accordingly, we start our sample period in February 1994, as from 
this date monetary policy surprises on the day of the FOMC meetings can be 
accurately measured. Most FOMC announcements since February 1994 have taken 
place at 14.15 EST, such that markets in Asia and in Europe were closed and affected 
only on the subsequent business day. Over the whole period February 1994 – 
December 2004, we have a total of 93 FOMC meetings. These include also 
unscheduled FOMC meetings, except for the one on 17 September 2001 following the 
11 September attacks.
3 Figure 1 plots the US monetary policy surprises over the 
included 93 FOMC meetings. 
 
Figure 1 
                                                 
2 See Gürkaynak (2005) for a detailed explanation of the methodology for calculating policy 
expectations based on Fed funds futures of different maturities. 
3 Excluding the other four unscheduled meetings from the sample reduces the overall effect of US 
monetary policy shocks somewhat. However, such an exclusion does not change the results shown 
below, in particular the cross sectional heterogeneity and the analysis of the channels of determinants 
in any significant way.   9
 
As we model the daily returns of stock markets on all days in our sample, i.e. also for 
non-FOMC meeting days, our measure of monetary policy shocks is set to zero for 
these days. 
 
3.3 Integration and macroeconomic determinants 
 
As discussed in the introduction, an important part of the analysis is to understand the 
channels through which US monetary policy shocks are transmitted to foreign equity 
markets. As for the transmission through US and foreign asset prices, we use the 
Datastream equity index also for the United States, and use three-month T-bill rates 
for short-term interest rates and ten-year yields for long-term rates. For foreign asset 
prices, we use mostly three-month money market rates and spot exchange rates, 
taking again daily closing quotes for both. 
 
Moreover, in order to study the role of macroeconomic determinants, we use various 
measures. One key element we analyse is the degree of financial openness of 
countries. We use the openness of the capital account, which is a dummy that takes 
the value zero if a country’s capital account is closed and one if it is open. The source 
of this data is the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). For the openness of the domestic equity markets as well as 
for the openness of the domestic financial sector we take the indicators developed by 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and complemented by Bussiere and Fratzscher 
(2004). All of these openness variables are dummies, being zero if a country’s market 
is closed and one if it is open.  
 
As to exchange rates, we use both de facto measures of exchange rate flexibility from 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) as well as a de jure classification from the IMF’s 
AREAER. We also use the actual exchange rate volatility, which is measured as the 
standard deviation of a country’s daily exchange rate changes against the US dollar 
over the previous 12-months. Other volatility proxies based on shorter or somewhat 
longer periods show very similar results to the ones presented below. 
 
Finally, for the degree of real and financial integration, we look at both the current 
account and the financial account of countries. Trade data are flows of exports and 
imports and stem from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. Financial account data 
are all stocks of assets and/or liabilities for FDI (source: UNCTAD), portfolio 
investment equity and debt (source: IMF CPIS), and other investment, which are 
mostly loans (source: BIS ILB). A key strength of this dataset is that it contains a 
geographic decomposition of trade and financial linkages, so that both real and 
financial integration can be measured vis-à-vis the rest of the world and, alternatively, 
vis-à-vis the United States alone. 
 
Most of the integration and macroeconomic variables vary over time and across 
countries, though there are some exceptions and some variables are not available for 
the full sample of countries. Annex 2 provides a more detailed summary of the 
sources and characteristics of all the variables. Table 1 provides some summary 
statistics of the variables, including the US monetary policy shock. 
 
Table 1   10
4. Benchmark model of financial transmission 
 
Our empirical modelling strategy consists of three parts. In the first part, which is 
presented in this section, we measure the overall transmission of US monetary policy 
shocks to US and foreign equity markets. We also decompose this transmission 
process by taking into account the cross-country heterogeneity and the cross-sector 
heterogeneity as well as possible time variations of the transmission process. In the 
second part, which is provided in section 5, we then try to explain this heterogeneity 
by distinguishing between two distinct transmission channels, before we turn to an 
analysis of the macroeconomic determinants in Section 6. 
 
4.1 Benchmark results 
 
Our first objective is to measure the overall transmission of US monetary policy 
shocks to foreign equity markets. As the most simple benchmark specification, we 
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Daily equity returns are thus a function of monetary policy shocks in the United 
States, St, as well as a vector Zt of controls such as past returns, day-of-the-week 
effects etc. β is our main parameter of interest, which measures the strength of the 
transmission of the shock to foreign equity markets. As discussed above, one would 
expect that the coefficient has a negative sign, as a positive monetary policy shock, 
i.e. higher interest rates than expected, induces negative equity returns. Moreover, the 
benchmark model includes a variable ε
rus which allows us to obtain a proxy for the 
‘general linkage’ between the US equity market and the foreign equity market in 
country i. ε





t US n t
US
t US Z S r ε δ β α + + + = ∑ , ,    (2) 
 
Thus ε
rus is in essence the US equity market return that is cleaned of the effect of US 
monetary policy shocks,
4 such that we can ensure in model (1) that β is orthogonal to 
γ. We speak of γ as measuring merely the “linkage” of the two equity markets because 
the parameter does not allow us to make any statement about the causality of equity 
market movements, i.e. it may be that a high and statistically significant γ parameter 
indicates a transmission from the US stock market to the foreign equity market, but it 
may equally well imply a transmission in the opposite direction. Hence there is a lack 
of identification in determining what drives ε
rus. The key objective for using the 
transmission of US monetary policy shocks is precisely to enable us to identify the 
source of the shock and thus the direction of causality in the transmission process.  
 
Nevertheless, measuring this general linkage is useful for several reasons. First, γ 
allows us to get an idea of the overall co-movements of foreign equity markets with 
the US market, though again this is only a secondary objective as we are primarily 
                                                 
4 In particular, recall that US monetary policy shocks, St, occur only on FOMC meeting days, i.e. only 
about every six weeks, so that St=0 for most days in the sample.   11
interested in identifying the causality of the transmission, i.e. in the parameter β. 
Second, γ serves as a robustness check: if the transmission of the US monetary policy 
shock β is typical for the transmission of other types of shocks from the US to foreign 
financial markets and if US markets are dominant in explaining the general linkage γ, 
then it should hold that γ β β ⋅ ≈
US . We will turn to this issue in detail in section 5 
when discussing the different channels of transmission. 
 
As to the specific estimator, we use for all models in this paper, except when 
indicated otherwise, an OLS estimator with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE), 
which corrects for heteroskedasticity and for the correlation of residuals across stock 
market indices.
5 This correction is important as neglecting such heteroskedasticity and 
cross-correlation leads to a substantial underestimation of the variance-covariance 




Table 2, row (1), shows the results for the US benchmark model (2) using the 
weighted equity returns rUS,t, whereas row (2) gives the analogous results when using 
the unweighted equity returns, 
u
t US r , , as explained above in section 3. We find that US 
stock markets respond significantly to a US monetary policy shocks. The magnitude 
of this effect is slightly larger than what was found in the papers discussed in Section 
2.1, at 7.9% for the weighted index, and at 6.5% for the unweighted index. Rows (3) 
and (4) show the corresponding results for the international transmission, based on 
equation (1), i.e. with the inclusion of country-fixed effects αi. The results show that a 
100 bp tightening in US monetary policy leads to a drop of the foreign weighted 
returns by 4.5% and of the unweighted returns by 3.8%. As such, the magnitude of the 
international stock markets response is more than half of the domestic one within the 
US. The general linkage for the weighted returns is 0.304, e.g. a 1% increase in US 
equity returns is on average associated with a 0.30% change in foreign equity returns. 
 
A first robustness test is to check whether the strength of the transmission relates to 
specific characteristics of the interest rate decision, such as whether or not the FOMC 
changed interest rates, whether there was a directional change in US monetary policy 
at a particular meeting, whether the surprise was small or large etc. We conduct this 
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with Dt =1 e.g. if there was no change in monetary policy at a particular FOMC 
meeting and Dt=0 otherwise, and analogously for other asymmetries. Table 3 shows 
the estimates for various specifications of such heterogeneity. Overall, the results 
                                                 
5 This estimator corrects for heteroskedasticity and assumes that residuals are contemporaneously 
correlated across panels. It estimates the covariance of the OLS coefficients as 
1 1 ) ' ( ' ) ' ( ˆ − − Ω = X X X X X X V where Ω is the covariance matrix of the residuals 
i ixT T mxm I ⊗ Σ = Ω . I is an 
identity matrix and Σ the m by m panel-by-panel covariance matrix of the residuals, formulated as 
ij j i ij T / ) ' ( ε ε = Σ
)
where εi and εj are the residuals for panels i and j from equation (1) and Tij is the 
number of residuals between the panels that can be matched by time period.   12
indicate that although there are some differences in the strength of the transmission, 
none of these differences is statistically significant, neither with weighted nor with 
unweighted return indices, as indicated by the p-values in the last column of the 
tables. We take this as evidence that in our further analysis below, we do not need to 





4.2 Cross-country and cross-sector heterogeneity 
 
Table 2 shows the average transmission across all countries and all sectors. To 
understand the degree of heterogeneity of the transmission process, we therefore now 
proceed to analyse the differences in the transmission across countries as well as 
across sectors. For this purpose, we allow for country-specific as well as sector-
specific intercepts and interactions with the US monetary policy shock and the general 
linkage. We therefore estimate the benchmark model by including return indices for 
each country and each sector, rikt (excluding the national market aggregates used in 
the preceding section): 
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Table 4 indicates that the cross-country variation in the financial transmission from 
the United States is substantial. Some of the more closed emerging markets – such as 
China, India, Peru, Sri Lanka and Malaysia – do not react significantly or only very 
weakly to US monetary policy shocks. By contrast, other emerging markets – for 
instance Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea and Turkey – react very strongly to US 
shocks, with some equity returns falling by 10% or more to a 100 bp tightening in US 
monetary policy. 
 
There are also substantial differences in the transmission of US shocks to advanced 
economies.
6 Some markets, such as those in Canada and Australia, react relatively 
strongly, while others, such as Japan’s, are far less responsive. Interestingly, the 
largest effects of US monetary policy shocks among advanced economies are 
recorded for Finland and Sweden. These are two economies where the high-tech 
sector is particularly important. Although model (4) controls for differences in the 
sector composition of countries’ equity indices, this finding may suggest that there are 
important sector spillovers within countries, i.e. all sectors react more strongly to US 
shocks in countries where the high tech sector is particularly important. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 
 
Table 5 gives the sector effects βk and γk. and indeed underlines the importance of 
such sector effects. The table confirms that the information/high-tech sector responds 
                                                 
6 Luxembourg is excluded from subsequent model estimations in part due to its special characteristic as 
financial centre, and in part due to a lack of some macroeconomic and integration data used below.   13
by far the strongest, with equity returns in this sector declining on average by 7.4% in 
response to a 100 bp tightening in US monetary policy. Also the financial sector, non-
cyclical services and the industrial sector respond relatively more strongly. By 
contrast, utilities and non-cyclical consumer goods react the least to US monetary 
policy shocks. 
 
Finally, an inspection of the general linkage parameters, γi for the country-specific 
effects and γk for the sector-specific effects, is useful as a robustness check. In 
general, larger monetary policy transmission is also associated with higher general 
linkages and vice versa. In fact, the ranking of the strength of the monetary policy 
transmission is almost identical to the ranking of the general linkage for the sector 




Taking together the sector and country-specific effects, Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of the effects of monetary policy shocks (horizontal axis) and the general 
linkage (vertical axis) across countries and sectors, i.e. all available βik and γik. It 
emphasises the high degree of dispersion in the shock transmission and the general 
equity market linkage. The similarity in the ranking of the strength of the monetary 
policy transmission and of the general linkage is apparent from the clear negative 
relationship between βik and γik in Figure 2. Figures 3 and 4 then distinguish between 
the country-specific and the sector-specific heterogeneity of the parameters. 
 
In summary, there is a substantial transmission of US monetary policy shocks to 
global equity markets. This transmission moreover exhibits a large degree of 
heterogeneity, both across countries and across sectors. This heterogeneity ranges 
from countries and sectors that are basically unaffected by US monetary policy shocks 
to those that react by 10% or more to a 100 bp change in US monetary policy. 
 
 
5.   Transmission channels 
 
What explains the size and this large degree of heterogeneity in the transmission of 
US monetary policy shocks to foreign equity markets? We distinguish between two 
distinct channels of transmission. First, the strength of the transmission of US 
monetary policy shocks to foreign equity markets over time may depend on the 
reaction of US asset prices themselves. Second, the transmission may occur through 
and thus its strength may be related to the response of foreign asset prices, in 
particular exchange rates and foreign interest rates.  
 
 
5.1 Channel 1 – US asset price reactions  
 
The strength of the financial transmission of the US monetary policy to foreign 
financial markets could depend on how US asset prices themselves react to a US 
monetary policy shock. There are in principal several different reasons why a US 
monetary policy shock may affect the equity valuation of foreign firms. There may be 
a direct transmission in that e.g. a rise in US interest rates raises borrowing costs for 
firms financing themselves directly in US markets, thus lowering their equity value.   14
Thus the strength of the transmission of the shock may depend on the extent to which 
short-term and long-term interest rates in the United States respond to monetary 
policy. The larger the response of US short-term rates, the higher is the expected 
effect on foreign equity markets, partly due to higher expected future returns and 
dividends, and possibly due to higher real interest rates.
7 
 
The hypothesis is less clear cut for long-term interest rates. First of all, the reaction of 
long-term rates to monetary policy itself is not clear a priori. For instance, a tightening 
of monetary policy, leading to an increase in short-term rates, can potentially be 
compatible with a reduction in long-term interest rates if markets perceive the 
tightening as a credible step by monetary authorities to reduce inflation in the long run 
(Thornton, 1998). Furthermore, even conditional on a given reaction of long-term 
rates, the response of equity markets is also ambiguous. On the one hand, a rise in 
long-term rates may induce higher real interest rates, thereby tightening financing 
constraints and lowering the discounted value of future earnings and thus inducing 
negative equity returns. On the other hand, higher long-term rates may signal 
expectations of higher economic growth, and thus raise the equity valuation of firms. 
 
Finally, the transmission of US monetary policy shocks to foreign equity markets may 
occur through US equity markets. Thus a tightening in US monetary policy that has a 
particularly strong effect on US equity returns may also have a larger effect on foreign 
markets e.g. if foreign firms’ earnings are closely linked to US returns. 
 
For the empirical model, we hence want to analyse whether the strength of the 
monetary policy shock transmission is a function of US asset price responses. We 
conduct two tests. First, we estimate the model of equation (3) but with Dt =1 if there 
is a relatively large US equity market, money market or bond market reaction in 
response to the US monetary policy shock – i.e. higher than the median value over all 
FOMC meetings in the sample period – and Dt=0 otherwise.
8 In other words, we are 
testing whether the transmission of the US monetary policy shock to foreign equity 
markets is related to the magnitude of the response of US asset prices. As a second 
test, we allow and test for the fact that the different channels through US financial 
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where D
l are 0-1 dummies for D
1=1 if the reaction of the US equity market is large – 
i.e. larger than its median over the sample period – and its short-term interest rate 
response on that day is relatively small – again relative to its median reaction over the 
whole sample period; D
2=1 if the reaction of US interest rates is high and the US 
equity market response on that day is relatively low; D
3=1 if the reaction of US 
                                                 
7 As discussed in section 3, we use three-month money market rates as our instrument for short-term 
interest rates. A relatively small response of these three-month rates to a monetary policy shock may 
indicate that market participants are surprised by the precise timing of the change, though not by the 
change itself, which e.g. may have been expected for the subsequent meeting and thus was already 
priced into the three-month rates. 
8 This categorisation using the median response for FOMC meeting days ensures that each category has 
roughly the same number of observations. Moreover, we tested and found that the results here and also 
for other related tests below are robust to the exclusion of outliers.   15
interest rates is large and the US equity market response on that day is relatively 
large; D
4=1 if the reaction of US interest rates is low and the US equity market 




Table 6 shows the results for these tests. Panel A for the individual US financial 
markets shows that there is a strong asymmetry only with regard to the reaction of US 
short-term interest rates: the transmission to foreign equity markets is more than twice 
as high when there is a relatively large change in US short rates – a drop of 7.9% in 
foreign equity markets due to a 100 bp tightening – as compared when this change is 
small – a 3.2% decline. There is a higher transmission also when US equity markets 
react relatively strongly; however, this asymmetry is not statistically significant. 
 
Panel B of Table 6 provides the parameter estimates for model (5). The results of 
Panel A are confirmed in that it is the size of the US interest rate response that is the 
most important channel for the strength of transmission of US monetary policy 
shocks. Again, the transmission parameters are more than twice as large when US 
short-term interest rates react relatively strongly as compared to when they change 
little in response to US monetary policy shocks. 
 
In summary, the response of US asset prices to US monetary policy shocks plays an 
important role in determining the strength of the transmission of such shocks to 
foreign equity returns. It is in particular the magnitude of the reaction of US short-
term interest rates that appear to matter for the transmission process. 
 
 
5.2  Channel 2 – Foreign asset prices 
 
As a second channel, the response of foreign asset prices is a potentially important 
factor that determines the strength of the transmission of US monetary policy to 
foreign equity markets. We focus on the reaction of a country’s exchange rate against 
the US dollar and foreign interest rates.
9 In particular, this analysis allows us to 
distinguish between four types of countries: 
 
•  fixer: exchange rate reacts little, interest rate reacts much 
•  floater: exchange rate reacts much, interest rate reacts little 
•  dependent country: exchange rate reacts much, interest rate reacts much 
•  independent country: exchange rate reacts little, interest rate reacts little 
 
The question we want to analyse is whether there is a difference in the financial 
transmission process according to the type of country. There is no clear-cut 
hypothesis about which types of countries should be affected the strongest and which 
ones the least though equity markets in “dependent” countries appear likely to react 
more to US monetary policy shocks than “independent” countries.  
 
                                                 
9 A test of the role of foreign bond yields is not conducted due to a lack of comparable data for the 50 
countries in the sample.   16
But the strength of the likely reaction is less apparent when comparing fixers and 
floaters. If the transmission to foreign equity markets takes place mainly through an 
adjustment in foreign interest rates, then countries with fixed exchange rate regimes 
should be affected more strongly. By contrast, if the transmission process is 
dominated by the exchange rate, then equity markets of those countries with more 
flexible exchange rates may be more sensitive to US monetary policy shocks. 
However, it is a priori not clear in which direction the exchange rate channel works. A 
tightening in US monetary policy should induce an appreciation of the US dollar, 
which in turn may hurt importers in other countries but benefit exporting firms as they 
gain competitiveness. Hence, ultimately it is an empirical question of how the 
financial transmission process is linked to the exchange rate reaction. 
 
We classify each country at each point in time into one of these four categories. This 
classification is based on the actual, de facto behaviour of a country’s exchange rate 
and short-term interest rates. For instance, a country whose exchange rate reacts more 
than the median reaction of all countries and whose interest rates changes relatively 
less than the median as measured on all FOMC meeting days is classified as a “fixer”, 
and analogously for the other three types. The distinction between “dependent” and 
“independent” countries is made because countries that e.g. adopt a flexible exchange 
rate regime may not necessarily acquire a higher degree of monetary policy 
autonomy, i.e. domestic interest rates may nevertheless still closely follow those in 
the United States, as such autonomy depends on a number of factors such as the 
degree of credibility of domestic monetary authorities.
10 
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where D
m are 0-1 dummies for D
1=1 if the country is a “fixer”, i.e. the reaction of the 
foreign interest rate of country i is relatively large – that is, larger than the median 
daily interest rate change over all countries and all FOMC meeting days – and its 
exchange rate response on that day is relatively small – again relative to the median 
daily exchange rate change of all countries over all FOMC meeting days; D
2=1 
accordingly if a country is a “floater”; D
3=1 if it is a “dependent country”; and D
4=1 
if it is an “independent country”.  
 
Note that channel 1 explains nothing of the cross-sectional heterogeneity as US asset 
price responses are the same for all foreign countries. By contrast, the present channel 
via foreign asset prices contains both a time-series dimension as well as a cross-
sectional dimension as a country may not always belong to one of these four groups, 
but may change its affiliation over time, e.g. if it moves from a fixed exchange rate 




                                                 
10 See e.g. Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2004) for an empirical analysis of the response of exchange 
rates and interest rates, and their determinants, across a broad set of mostly emerging market 
economies.   17
Panel A of Table 7 provides the results analogous to model (3), whereas Panel B 
shows the reaction to US monetary policy shocks across the four types of countries 
for model (6). Panel A indicates that the transmission process is indeed related to both 
exchange rates and interest rates: for both, there is indeed a stronger transmission if 
they react relatively strongly to a US monetary policy shock, although statistical 
significance is found only at the 10% level.  
 
For the analysis of the monetary policy/exchange rate regimes of countries, Panel B 
reveals that the drop of “dependent” countries’ stock markets by 5.2% in response to a 
100 bp tightening in US monetary policy is substantially larger than that of the other 
three types of countries, and statistically significantly so. “Independent” countries 
react the least to US monetary policy shocks – showing a 2.3% drop to a 100 bp 
tightening. Finally, floaters appear to respond somewhat more than fixers to such a 
US monetary policy shock, though this difference is not statistically significant, as 
indicated by the p-values of the t-test in the last three columns of the table. 
 
A note of caution is in order here. The fact that the transmission process of US 
monetary policy shocks to foreign stock markets is related to the reaction of foreign 
interest rates and exchange rates does not necessarily imply that the transmission to 
foreign equity markets goes through interest rates and exchange rates. Indeed, for 
instance for domestic US markets it has been shown that although the transmission of 
US short-term interest rate changes is highly important for US equity returns, there is 
at times also a transmission in the opposite direction from equity markets to money 
markets (Rigobon and Sack 2003). 
 
Overall, the financial transmission of US monetary policy shocks to foreign equity 
markets indeed appears significantly related to the response of other foreign asset 
prices. Stock markets in countries where exchange rates and interest rates react the 
most to US monetary policy respond about two to three times stronger to such shocks 
than countries where these two asset prices react relatively little.  
 
 
6.  Determinants of financial transmission  
 
Section 5 has analysed through which channels the transmission of US monetary 
policy shocks to foreign equity markets may occur. The issue we turn to now, given 
these channels, is what the determinants are that explain why some countries’ equity 
markets overall respond more strongly to such shocks. We focus in this section on the 
role of macroeconomic policies – in particular the degree of openness and exchange 
rate policies – and the extent of real and financial integration of countries, and provide 
some extensions and robustness checks of the empirical results. 
 
6.1  The role of macroeconomic policies 
 
As to macroeconomic policies, one would expect that countries that are financially 
open are much more affected by US monetary policy and other shocks. More 
openness implies that capital can move more freely. A US monetary policy shock may 
induce a rebalancing of asset portfolios not only in the United States, but more 
generally in global markets overall, and in particular in those that are more open 
financially. We analyse various dimensions of financial openness: the openness of the   18
capital account, the domestic equity market and the domestic financial sector, as well 
as the overall market capitalisation of the domestic stock market relative to GDP as a 
proxy for the depth and liquidity of the market. Moreover, exchange rate policies may 
matter. Related to the analysis in section 5.2, we analyse the role of the exchange rate 
regime but focus here additionally on the de jure regime.  
 
As explained in Section 2.4, we expect that countries that are highly integrated with 
the United States, both in terms of finance and in terms of the real economy, should 
be more responsive to US monetary policy shocks for several reasons. On the one 
hand, there should be a closer linkage at the macroeconomic level; on the other hand, 
individual stocks are more likely to be affected beyond the macroeconomic linkages, 
through effects on their financing costs and their growth outlook. Finally, for 
investors, a rebalancing of portfolios should affect these countries more strongly. 
 
We use several proxies for real and financial integration. First, we look at the role of 
trade, both as the sum of bilateral inflows and outflows between a particular country i 
and the United States or the whole world as well as separated into inflows and 
outflows to or from country i. Second, we test whether stocks of FDI, portfolio equity, 
portfolio debt or other investment/loans play a role for the transmission process. 
Finally, we also test for the role of business cycle correlation, using the correlation of 
annual GDP growth rates in 1980-2003 between country i and the United States. 
 
In the empirical model, we use a discrete definition of determinant Xit: 
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with X
low=1 if the determinant X of country i at time t lies in the lowest third of the 
distribution across all countries over the sample period, and zero otherwise, and 
analogously for X
mid and X
high. This specification has the advantage that it nests a 
linear model, and that the magnitude of the parameters can be easily interpreted and 
compared. Note that most determinants are varying both across time and across 
countries, though some of the determinants only vary across countries, such as 




Table 8 shows the estimates for openness, exchange rate regimes and business cycle 
correlation. There is indeed a strong relationship between the openness of countries 
and the strength of the transmission of US monetary policy shocks. In particular, US 
monetary policy affects equity markets only in countries that have an open equity 
market and an open domestic financial sector; whereas closed markets exhibit no 
statistically significant response (panel A, Table 8). 
 
As to exchange rates, it appears that it is not the de jure exchange rate regime that 
matters but the de facto regime.
11 Panel B shows that stock markets in countries with 
                                                 
11 This finding is consistent with Shambaugh (2004), which focuses specifically on comparing the 
responsiveness of monetary policy to foreign shocks under different de facto exchange rate regimes.   19
more volatile exchange rates, both in effective terms or against the US dollar, react 
about twice as strongly as those with the least volatile ones – 5.5/5.6% as compared to 
2.7% in response to a 100 bp change.
12 By contrast, there is no significant difference 
in the transmission among countries that de jure have declared to have a fixed or a 
floating exchange rate regime. 
 
These two results on openness and on exchange rates may go some way in 
understanding the cross-country differences in the transmission of US monetary 
policy shocks discussed in section 4.2. For instance, the findings may explain to a 
significant extent why relatively closed emerging markets – such as China, India, 
Peru, Sri Lanka and Malaysia – do not react significantly or only very weakly to US 
monetary policy shocks, and why markets such as that of Hong Kong, which has a 
very open financial sector, show a relatively large response. 
 
Next we turn to business cycle correlation and other macroeconomic variables as 
shown in panel C of Table 8. There appears indeed a significant relationship between 
the degree of business cycle correlation with the United States and the extent to which 
a country’s stock market is affected by US monetary policy shocks; equity markets in 
countries with a low level of GDP correlation with the US react by 2.6%, which is 
significantly less than the 4.8% in countries with a high correlation. Little systematic 
role is however found for the degree of indebtedness of a country. There is also no 
systematic relationship between the transmission of the shocks and geographic 
distance – often used as a proxy for information asymmetries and transaction costs in 
the gravity literature. A broad set of other macroeconomic variables, such as the 
correlation of domestic inflation rates with those in the US, were tested and were not 
found to be significantly related to the transmission process. They are not shown in 
the tables for reasons of brevity. 
 
  
6.2  The role of trade and financial integration 
 
As the last step, we turn to the role of real and financial integration as a determinant 
for the transmission process of US monetary policy shocks. Table 9 shows the 
estimates when using integration proxies that measure the sum of inflows and 
outflows or the sum of assets and liabilities of residents in country i, vis-à-vis the 
whole world in panel A, and vis-à-vis the United States in panel B. Table 10 conducts 
the same analysis separately for inflows and outflows or assets and liabilities vis-à-vis 




The key finding of Table 9 is that the financial transmission process to equity markets 
is strongly related to the degree of integration of countries vis-à-vis the whole world 
(panel A), but basically unrelated to the integration with the United States alone 
(panel B). In panel A for the integration with the world, countries that have a high 
degree of trade and that have a large size of financial assets and liabilities with the rest 
of the world react two to three times more strongly to US monetary policy shocks 
                                                 
12 The results using real exchange rates are very similar to those with nominal exchange rates shown in 
the table.   20
than countries with a low degree of such integration. This holds almost equally for all 
four types of capital (FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt and other investment). Note 
that it is hard to disentangle which type of capital plays relatively more important role 
for the transmission process as there is a high degree of correlation across these 
different proxies of financial integration. 
 
By contrast, the relationship between the degree of integration of countries with the 
United States and the strength of the transmission of US monetary policy shocks to 
these countries is much weaker (panel B, Table 9). The case of other investment loans 
is the only one where a high degree of financial integration coincides with a stronger 
reaction to monetary policy shocks than a low degree.  
 
To understand better the weak evidence regarding integration with the United States, 
we analyse the issue in more depth by distinguishing between inflows and outflows 
for trade, and between asset and liabilities for capital stocks in Table 10. But also this 
split reveals no systematic relationship between a country’s integration with the 
United States and the strength of the financial transmission of US monetary policy to 
its equity markets. 
 
An important caveat is that the different proxies for real and financial integration and 
macroeconomic variables are in some cases significantly correlated with one another; 
for instance, countries that are very open to trade are generally also open to financial 
investment from abroad. Hence, one should not give too much weight in interpreting 
the role of individual variables. Nevertheless, the fact that the results do not change 
much with regard to the statistical significance of e.g. individual financial integration 
variables, underlines the robustness of the results. 
 
Finally, we conduct several extensions and robustness tests to these results. In 
particular, many other US developments and news are likely to be transmitted to 
foreign equity markets. It is impossible to capture and include all relevant US news, 
but we have a set of 11 of the most important announcements of US macroeconomic 
news
13 which we have included and tested. The first important result from this 
exercise is that the transmission of US monetary policy shocks to global equity 
markets is basically unchanged when controlling for US macroeconomic news. This is 
shown by the coefficient for US monetary policy shocks of -0.039 in Table 11. 
Equally importantly, several US macroeconomic shocks have a significant effect on 
foreign equity markets, including non-farm payroll employment, CPI, PPI, advanced 




                                                 
13 These are the surprise component of the announcements of the following US macroeconomic news: 
mostly monthly announcements for non-farm payroll employment, ISM business confidence, consumer 
confidence, GDP (advance releases), industrial production, CPI, PPI, retail sales, trade balance, 
housing starts and hours worked per week. The surprise component of a variable is calculated as the 
difference between the announced value and the expected value, where the latter is measured as the 
median expectation in surveys conducted by Money Market Services (MMS) International. 
14 The variable that at first may appear to have a counter-intuitive sign is non-farm payroll 
employment. However, Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005) show why negative employment news tend 
to raise stock returns, which mainly occurs through expectations of monetary easing. Note that 
although monetary policy is endogenous to many macroeconomic variables, the use of the 
announcement surprise of these variables ensures exogeneity of all the shocks in the empirical model.   21
The second important finding is that the transmission process of US macroeconomic 
shocks is similar in its structure to the transmission of US monetary policy shocks. As 
an example, Tables 12 and 13 show the findings for the determinants of the 
transmission of shocks in US industrial production. We again find that the 
transmission of such US shocks to global equity markets takes place mainly for those 
countries that are highly integrated with the rest of the world, but not necessarily with 
the United States (Table 12). Nevertheless, overall the transmission of shocks in US 
industrial production to global equity markets is significantly weaker – in the sense 
that it affects fewer countries – but similar in the role of the determinants as that of 
US monetary policy shocks. 
 
Tables 12 and 13 
 
In summary, there is a strong relationship between, on the one hand, macroeconomic 
policies with regard to financial openness and exchange rates as well as the degree of 
real and financial integration, and, on the other hand, the financial transmission of US 
monetary policy to foreign equity markets. Financially open countries and also those 
with more volatile and flexible exchange rate react substantially more to US monetary 
policy. A key finding of this section is that the degree of integration with the rest of 
the world is strongly linked to the effect of US monetary policy on foreign equity 
markets, with stock returns in highly integrated countries reacting two to three times 
more strongly. However, it appears to be the integration with the world as a whole, 
and not the specific integration with the United States, that determines the strength of 





How are shocks transmitted through international financial markets? And through 
which channels does the transmission process take place? The difficulty of answering 
these questions is that asset prices, domestically as well as internationally, are 
determined simultaneously, and hence it is difficult and complex to understand the 
underlying causality in the transmission process. This paper has focused on one 
particular type of shock – a US monetary policy shock – to analyse the financial 
transmission across equity markets for a broad set of 50 equity markets, including 
those in all major advanced economies and emerging market economies. 
 
There are two key advantages to this approach: first, we are able to obtain a truly 
exogenous shock to financial markets; our measure of US monetary policy shocks is 
based on the reaction of Federal funds futures in the 30-minute period around the 
announcement of FOMC decisions. Second, monetary policy is one of the most 
important drivers of global financial markets and thus understanding the transmission 
of such shocks is relevant for gauging the overall financial linkages and integration 
across equity markets. 
 
In our empirical analysis, we find that a 100 bp tightening of US monetary policy 
reduces equity returns on average by 3.8%. We show that there is a substantial degree 
of heterogeneity in the effect of US monetary policy on country-specific and sector-
specific equity returns. For the cross-country heterogeneity, a few local equity 
markets – such as those of China, India and Malaysia – change hardly at all while   22
others react substantially to US monetary policy shocks – in particular those in Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Korea and Turkey among emerging markets, and Australia, Canada, 
Finland and Sweden among advanced economies – in some cases by 10% or more in 
response to a 100 bp change. For the cross-sector heterogeneity, the effects of the 
transmission vary from a reaction of 1.6% for utilities to 7.4% for the information 
technology sector. 
 
The paper has then analysed the transmission channels of the US monetary policy 
shocks, distinguishing between two separate channels –via US asset and foreign asset 
prices respectively. We find that in particular the transmission via US and foreign 
short-term interest rates as well as the exchange rate play an important role. The 
transmission of US monetary policy shocks is found to be particularly strong when 
the US short-term interest rates react strongly, as well as when the reaction of the 
exchange rate is large. 
 
Analysing the macroeconomic determinants for the strength of spillovers, we find 
particularly strong transmission for countries that have open and relatively liquid 
financial markets. Moreover, there is substantial evidence that the transmission 
process is related to the degree of real and financial integration: equity markets in 
countries that are relatively open to trade and in particular those that hold a large 
magnitude of cross-border financial assets react two to three times more strongly to 
US monetary policy shocks than those of less integrated countries. A striking finding 
is that it is the degree of integration with the entire rest of the world that appears to 
matter for the financial transmission process, and not the bilateral integration of 
countries with the United States.  
 
Finally, we find that the transmission of US monetary policy shocks is very similar in 
strength and nature to the general equity market linkage between the US and foreign 
markets on days when no monetary policy decisions take place. Furthermore, the 
paper shows that the same range of macroeconomic determinants is responsible for 
the strength of international equity responses to the shocks of other macroeconomic 
announcements, such as shocks to US employment, inflation, GDP, industrial 
production, and the trade balance. Taking the evidence of the paper together, the 
findings suggest that US monetary policy and macroeconomic shocks are indeed 
global rather than idiosyncratic shocks, as they affect most if not all markets 
simultaneously. This implies that diversification and insurance against such shocks is 
limited, a finding with important implications for portfolio diversification and risk-
sharing in global capital markets. Understanding the implications for global capital 
flows and portfolio choices are important areas for future research.   23
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Argentina √√√√√√√ 23/06/94 x √
Australia √√√√√√√√√√
Austria √√√x √√√√x √
Belgium x √√ 18/10/96 √√√√√√
Brazil 04/07/94 04/07/94 04/07/94 11/12/96 04/07/94 04/02/02 04/07/94 04/07/94 x 04/07/94
Canada √√√√√√√√√√
Chile √√√x √√√√x √
China 12/05/98 √ 02/02/94 √ 01/11/94 √√√ 26/06/97 √
Columbia √√ 06/01/98 √√√√√ 23/08/94 √
Cyprus 28/11/95 √ 05/05/97 √√√√√ 05/05/99 √
Czech Republic √√√√√ 14/03/95 14/03/95 √√√
Denmark x √√√√√√√ 29/03/99 √
Finland 18/04/05 √√ 06/06/95 √√√ 07/12/94 √√
France √√√√√√√ 18/07/00 √√
Germany x √√√√√√√√√
Greece 16/12/94 √√√√√ 30/04/96 √√√
Hong Kong √√√√√√√√√√
Hungary 28/11/95 √ 05/05/97 √√√√√ 05/05/99 √
India √√√√√√√√√√
Indonesia 12/10/94 √√√√√ 19/10/94 √ x √
Ireland x √√√√√ 18/03/04 √ 02/05/97 √
Israel √√√ 01/01/98 √ x √ x √√
Italy √√√√√√√√√√
Japan √√√√√√√√√√
Korea √√√√√√√√ 18/08/95 √
Luxembourg √√√x √√ 30/01/97 √ x √
Malaysia √√√√√√√√ 30/07/98 √
Mexico √√√√√√√xx√
Netherlands √√√√√√√x √√
New Zealand √√ 31/03/94 √√√√√x √
Norway √√√ 05/07/94 √√√√√√
Pakistan √√√√√√ 16/11/94 √ x √
Peru √√√√√√√ 22/07/96 x √
Philippines √√√x √√√√x √
Poland 30/01/96 √√ 11/07/96 √ 27/10/95 18/11/98 √ 10/02/98 √
Portugal √√√√√√√ 17/06/97 01/07/99 √
Romania 09/02/98 05/12/96 05/12/96 04/06/97 01/04/97 23/04/97 x x x 15/10/97
Russia 20/06/94 20/06/94 x 20/06/94 02/11/94 10/09/96 20/06/94 20/06/94 14/07/00 20/06/94
Singapore √√√√√√√x √ x
South Africa √√√√√√√xxx
Spain √√√√√√√√ 16/11/99 √
Sri Lanka 19/11/96 √√√√√√xx√
Sweden 06/09/01 √√√√√ 27/05/94 x √√
Switzerland x √√√√√√√√√
Taiwan x √√√√ 03/07/89 19/09/00 x √√




Venezuela 05/01/99 √√x √ 15/03/00 22/11/96 √ x √  
 
Note: The table shows the data availability for sector equity price indices. √ indicates availability for 
the full sample period, x means that no data is available, and a date indicates the starting date of a 
particular index series. 
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US monetary policy shocks – change of the Fed funds futures 
rates in the 30 minutes around FOMC policy announcements on 
FOMC meeting days 
Gürkaynak, Sack, and 
Swanson (2005) 
Equity market returns – Log changes in Datastream price 
indices for 10 sectors and 50 countries 
Datastream 
Exchange rates, money market rates and bond yields – Log 
changes in daily spot exchange rates against the US dollar, 3-
month (mostly) money market rates and 10-year bonds 
Bloomberg, Datastream 
and national sources 
Trade – the sum of imports and exports of goods and services 
between country i and the United States or the rest of the world 
(ROW), as a ratio of GDPs of country i and the US or ROW 
IFS, IMF 
FDI stocks – sum of FDI asset and liability holdings between 
country i and the United States or the rest of the world, as a 
ratio of GDPs of country i and the US or ROW 
UNCTAD 
Portfolio equity and portfolio debt stocks – sum of asset and 
liability holdings, averaged over 2001-2003, between country i 
and the United States or the rest of the world, as a ratio of 
GDPs of country i and the US or ROW 
Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS), 
IMF 
Cross-border loans – sum of asset and liability holdings of 
claims of banks between country i and the United States or the 
rest of the world, as a ratio of GDPs of country i and the US or 
ROW 
International Locational 
Banking Statistics (ILB), 
BIS 
Capital account openness – dummy equal to one if a country 
had fully liberalized its capital account and zero otherwise 
Annual Report of 
Exchange Arrangements 
and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER), IMF 
Equity market openness – dummy equal to one if a country 
had fully liberalized its equity market and zero otherwise 
Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2003), Bussiere and 
Fratzscher (2004) 
Domestic financial sector openness – dummy equal to one if a 
country had fully liberalized its domestic financial system and 
zero otherwise 
Kaminsky and Schmukler 
(2003), Bussiere and 
Fratzscher (2004) 
Stock market capitalization – stock market capitalization 
relative to domestic GDP 
Datastream and IFS 
Volatility of exchange rate – standard deviation of daily 
exchange rate changes (either in effective terms or vis-à-vis the 
US dollar) over the previous 12 months 
IFS, IMF and JP Morgan 
Exchange rate regime – dummy equal to zero if a country’s 
exchange rate is fixed (classification 1 or 2 of Reinhart-Rogoff) 
and one if it is more flexible (classification 3 or 4) 
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004) 
GDP correlation – bilateral correlation of annual real GDP 
growth rates between a particular country and the United States 
over the period 1980-2003 
IFS, IMF and OECD 
Net indebtedness – sum of liabilities of FDI, portfolio 
investment and other investment as a ratio to GDP 
UNCTAD, CPIS and BIS 
Geographic distance – log bilateral great circle distance in 
miles between economic centers of source country and host 
country 
Andy Rose’s website  
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Note: The figure shows the US monetary policy shocks (in basis points), based on the reaction of Fed 
funds futures rates, in the 30 minutes around FOMC policy announcements on FOMC meeting days. 
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Note: The figure shows the country-sector effects βik = βi + βk and γik = γi + γk of US monetary policy 
shocks on 10 sector return indices across 50 countries from: 
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t i n k i ikt D D S D D S Z r
US US ε ε γ β ε γ β δ α α + + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ,      (4) 
 
See Tables 4 and 5 for the statistical significance of country-specific effects and sector-specific effects, 
respectively.   30














































Note: The figure shows the country-specific effects βi and γi of US monetary policy shocks on 10 
sector return indices across 50 countries from: 
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US US ε ε γ β ε γ β δ α α + + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ,      (4) 
 
See Table 4 for the statistical significance of the country-specific effects. 
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Note: The figure shows the sector-specific effects βk and γk of US monetary policy shocks on 10 sector 
return indices across 50 countries from: 
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n
t i n k i ikt D D S D D S Z r
US US ε ε γ β ε γ β δ α α + + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ,      (4) 
 
See Table 5 for the statistical significance of the sector-specific effects. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
US MONETARY POLICY SHOCK -1.388 9.035 -43.8 16.3
OPENNESS, EXCHANGE RATES AND MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES
A. OPENNESS
Capital account 0.643 0.479 0 1
Equity market 0.894 0.308 0 1
Domestic financial sector 0.878 0.327 0 1
Stock market capitalisation 0.677 4.951 0.132 113.5
B. EXCHANGE RATE
Volatility of effective exchange rate 0.027 0.030 0 1.086
Volatility vis-à-vis US dollar 0.028 0.035 0 1.894
Regime - de jure 0.689 0.463 0 1
C. OTHER
GDP correlation with US 0.365 0.311 -0.131 0.889
Net indebtedness -0.009 0.114 -0.361 0.474
Geographic distance 8.585 0.420 6.981 9.154
REAL AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
A. WITH THE WORLD - ASSETS & LIABILITIES, IN- & OUTFLOWS
Total trade 0.137 0.115 0.027 0.960
Total capital 0.210 0.338 0.084 2.577
   FDI 0.078 0.134 0.036 1.189
   Portfolio equity 0.065 0.091 0.024 0.053
   Portfolio debt 0.012 0.016 0.008 0.064
   Other investment/loans 0.114 0.223 0.000 1.737
B. WITH THE UNITED STATES - ASSETS & LIABILITIES, IN- & OUTFLOWS
Total trade 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.045
Total capital 0.018 0.020 0.010 0.098
   FDI 0.044 0.048 0.004 0.051
   Portfolio equity 0.008 0.015 0.001 0.066
   Portfolio debt 0.019 0.018 0.004 0.066
   Other investment/loans 0.026 0.058 0.001 0.034
 
 
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the monetary policy shock, in basis points; the openness, 
exchange rate and macroeconomic variables, as defined in the text and in Annex 2; and the financial 
integration variables, in percent of GDP of country i.    33
Table 2: Transmission of US monetary policy shocks – benchmark model 
 
Benchmark effects β std error γ std error
(1) United States, weighted index -0.079 ***0.017 -- -- --
(2) United States, unweighted index -0.065 ***0.013 -- -- --
(3) International transmission, weighted indices -0.045 ***0.007 0.348 ***0.010




Note: The table shows the response of US equity returns to US monetary policy shocks estimated as  
 
US r
t t US t
US
t US r S r ε δ β α + + + = −1 , ,        (2) 
 
in rows (1) and (2), and the response of the equity return market indices of 50 countries to US 






t t i it Z S r
US ε δ ε γ β α + + + + = ∑ ,       (1) 
 
using country-fixed effects in rows (3) and (4). Rows (1) and (3) show results with a weighted index, 
based on relative market capitalisation of the stocks in the index, rows (2) and (4) with unweighted 
indices, i.e. unweighted averages of 10 sector return indices. Sample: Daily data, February 1994 - 
December 2004 (thus including 93 FOMC meetings). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively.   34




Monetary policy shock β1 std error β2 std error p-value
(1) Monetary policy: no change vs. change -0.038 ***0.008 -0.047 ***0.003 0.305
(2) Directional change: no vs. yes -0.044 ***0.003 -0.052 ***0.006 0.255
(3) Monetary policy shock: negative vs. positive -0.047 ***0.003 -0.040 ***0.007 0.382
(4) Monetary policy shock: small vs. large -0.046 ***0.003 -0.042 ***0.007 0.558
(5) Volatility: small vs. large -0.047 ***0.008 -0.044 ***0.013 0.855
(6) Monetary policy: no change vs. change -0.033 ** 0.016 -0.039 ***0.007 0.713
(7) Directional change: no vs. yes -0.039 ***0.007 -0.037 ***0.013 0.902
(8) Monetary policy shock: negative vs. positive -0.039 ***0.007 -0.034 ** 0.015 0.491
(9) Monetary policy shock: small vs. large -0.039 ***0.007 -0.036 ** 0.015 0.882






Note: The model estimates the effect of US monetary policy shocks on 50 country indices, depending 






t t t t t i it Z D S D S r
US ε δ ε γ β β α + + + − + + = ∑ , 2 1 ) 1 (         ( 3 )  
 
with Dt =1 e.g. if there was no change in monetary policy at a particular FOMC meeting and Dt=0 
otherwise, and analogously for other asymmetries. Small and large monetary policy shocks are defined 
by the average surprise over the full sample. Equivalently, for the volatility case, small and large are 
defined relative to the average volatility over the full sample. “Difference” shows the significance level 
of tests for the null hypothesis that two respective coefficients are equal. The upper part shows results 
using weighted, the lower with unweighted indices. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Country effects of transmission of US monetary policy shocks 
 
Country: βi p-value γi p-value βi−β p γi−γ p
Argentina -0.039 ***0.000 0.467 ***0.000 0.002 0.166 ***
Australia -0.060 ***0.000 0.375 ***0.000 -0.019 *** 0.073 **
Austria -0.047 ***0.000 0.175 ***0.000 -0.006 -0.132 ***
Belgium -0.035 ***0.000 0.270 ***0.000 0.007 -0.034
Brazil -0.041 ***0.000 0.502 ***0.000 0.000 0.202 **
Canada -0.059 ***0.004 0.564 ***0.000 -0.019 0.266 ***
Chile -0.012 ** 0.039 0.244 ***0.000 0.029 *** -0.062
China 0.014 0.130 0.030 ***0.000 0.056 *** -0.280 ***
Colombia 0.015 0.422 0.026 0.281 0.057 *** -0.284 ***
Cyprus -0.048 ***0.000 0.133 ***0.000 -0.007 -0.173 ***
Czech Republic -0.043 ***0.000 0.079 ** 0.026 -0.002 -0.231 ***
Denmark -0.042 ***0.000 0.360 ***0.000 -0.001 0.056
Finland -0.073 ***0.000 0.358 ***0.000 -0.033 *** 0.055
France -0.040 ***0.001 0.318 ***0.000 0.001 0.014
Germany -0.037 ***0.000 0.279 ***0.000 0.004 -0.026
Greece -0.046 ***0.000 0.323 ***0.000 -0.005 0.020
Hong Kong -0.075 ***0.000 0.482 ***0.000 -0.035 ** 0.181 ***
Hungary -0.042 ***0.000 0.346 ***0.000 -0.001 0.042
India -0.011 0.290 0.131 ***0.000 0.031 *** -0.177 ***
Indonesia -0.159 ***0.009 0.421 ***0.000 -0.119 * 0.119 **
Ireland -0.036 ***0.002 0.280 ***0.000 0.005 -0.025
Israel -0.036 ***0.000 0.314 ***0.000 0.005 0.010
Italy -0.050 ***0.000 0.221 ***0.000 -0.010 -0.086 ***
Japan -0.011 ** 0.035 0.291 ***0.000 0.030 *** -0.013
Korea -0.101 ***0.000 0.493 ***0.000 -0.061 *** 0.193 ***
Luxemburg -0.053 ***0.000 0.191 ** 0.048 -0.012 -0.115
Malaysia -0.029 ***0.000 0.344 ***0.000 0.013 * 0.041
Mexico -0.011 0.373 0.574 ***0.000 0.031 ** 0.276 ***
Netherlands -0.050 ***0.000 0.385 ***0.000 -0.009 0.082
New Zealand -0.041 ***0.000 0.293 ***0.000 0.001 -0.012
Norway -0.057 ***0.000 0.340 ***0.000 -0.016 ** 0.037
Pakistan 0.031 0.149 0.034 0.492 0.074 *** -0.276 ***
Peru -0.001 0.897 0.106 ***0.000 0.041 *** -0.202 ***
Philippines -0.037 ** 0.015 0.283 ***0.000 0.004 -0.021
Poland -0.030 ***0.001 0.467 ***0.000 0.012 0.166 ***
Portugal -0.030 ***0.001 0.131 ***0.000 0.011 -0.177 ***
Romania -0.002 0.781 0.061 ***0.006 0.039 *** -0.247 ***
Russia -0.043 ** 0.018 0.340 ***0.000 -0.002 0.036
Singapore -0.051 ***0.001 0.351 ***0.000 -0.010 0.048
South Africa -0.044 ***0.000 0.410 ***0.000 -0.003 0.107 ***
Spain -0.059 ***0.000 0.213 ***0.000 -0.018 ** -0.094 ***
Sri Lanka -0.001 0.932 0.033 ***0.000 0.041 *** -0.275 ***
Sweden -0.086 ***0.000 0.406 ***0.000 -0.046 *** 0.104 *
Switzerland -0.039 ***0.000 0.268 ***0.000 0.003 -0.037
Taiwan -0.036 ***0.000 0.302 ***0.000 0.005 -0.003
Thailand -0.059 ***0.000 0.340 ***0.000 -0.018 0.037
Turkey -0.117 ***0.000 0.355 ***0.000 -0.078 *** 0.052 *
United Kingdom -0.041 ***0.000 0.280 ***0.000 0.000 -0.025
Venezuela 0.027 ** 0.046 0.113 ** 0.018 0.069 *** -0.194 ***
Parameter estimates Difference to mean
 
Note: The model estimates the effect of US monetary policy shocks on 10 sector return indices across 
50 countries, controlling for country- and sector-fixed effects using: 
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US US ε ε γ β ε γ β δ α α + + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ,      (4) 
The table shows the country-specific effects βi and γi.  “Difference to mean” shows the significance 
level of tests for the null hypothesis that the country-coefficients are equal to their global average.***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively.   36
Table 5: Sector effects of transmission of US monetary policy shocks 
 
Sector: βk p-value γk p-value βk−β p γk−γ p
Financial -0.044 ***0.000 0.315 ***0.000 -0.003 0.016
Information technology -0.074 ***0.000 0.517 ***0.000 -0.036 *** 0.231 ***
Utilities -0.016 ** 0.011 0.189 ***0.000 0.028 *** -0.124 ***
Non-cyclical services -0.051 ***0.000 0.412 ***0.000 -0.012 * 0.125 ***
Cyclical services -0.040 ***0.000 0.302 ***0.000 0.001 -0.002
Cyclical consumer goods -0.040 ***0.000 0.263 ***0.000 0.001 -0.044
Industrial -0.045 ***0.000 0.315 ***0.000 -0.005 0.017
Basic industries -0.034 ***0.000 0.275 ***0.000 0.008 -0.032
Resources -0.047 ***0.000 0.242 ***0.000 -0.006 -0.066 **
Non-cyclical consumer goods -0.026 ***0.001 0.229 ***0.000 0.017 *** -0.081 ***
Parameter estimates Difference to mean
 
 
Note: The model estimates the effect of US monetary policy shocks on 10 sector return indices across 
50 countries, controlling for country- and sector-fixed effects using: 
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The table shows the sector-specific effects βk and γk. “Difference to mean” shows the significance level 
of tests for the null hypothesis that the sector-coefficients are equal to their global average. ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Channel 1 – Transmission of US monetary policy shocks via US 
financial markets 
 
Panel A: US equity market, money market and bond market reaction 
Individual US asset price change: β std error coef p-value
(1)       US equity market
 - low US equity market reaction -0.032 ***0.012 -0.005 0.701
 - high US equity market reaction -0.037 ***0.008
(2)       US interest rates
 - low US interest rate reaction -0.032 ***0.007 -0.047 *** 0.009
 - high US interest rate reaction -0.079 ***0.016
(3)       US bond yields
 - low US bond yield reaction -0.039 ***0.007 -0.001 0.924
 - high US bond yield reaction -0.040 ***0.012
Parameter estimates Test for difference
 
 
Panel B: Combined US equity market and money market reaction 
 
Combined US asset price change: β std error (1) (2) (3)
(1)       US equity market channel
 - low US interest rate & high US equity reaction -0.030 ***0.004
(2)       US interest rate channel
 - high US interest rate & low US equity reaction -0.073 ***0.011 0.00
(3)       US interest rate & equity channels
 - high US interest rate & high US equity reaction -0.077 ***0.012 0.00 0.81
(4)       No  US asset price channel
 - low US interest rate & low US equity reaction -0.030 ***0.007 0.96 0.00 0.00
Parameter estimates Test for difference vs.
 
 
Note: The model estimates the effect of US monetary policy shocks on 50 unweighted country indices, 
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with Dt =1 if there was a relatively large US equity market, money market or bond market reaction in 
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where D
l are 0-1 dummies for D
1=1 if the reaction of the US equity market is large – i.e. larger than its 
median over the sample period – and its short-term interest rate response on that day is relatively small 
– again relative to its median reaction over the whole sample period; D
2=1 if the reaction of US interest 
rates is high and the US equity market response on that day is relatively low; D
3=1 if the reaction of US 
interest rates is large and the US equity market response on that day is relatively large; D
4=1 if the 
reaction of US interest rates is low and the US equity market response on that day is small; and zero 
otherwise. The subscript t indicates that the variable varies over time. “Test for difference” shows the 
significance level of tests for the null hypothesis that two respective coefficients are equal. ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively.   38
Table 7: Channel 2 – Transmission of US monetary policy shocks via foreign 
money markets and exchange rates 
 
Panel A: Exchange rate reaction and foreign interest rate reaction 
 
Foreign asset price change: β std error coef p-value
(1)       exchange rate
 - low exchange rate reaction -0.032 ***0.004 -0.009 * 0.075
 - high exchange rate reaction -0.041 ***0.004
(2)       interest rate
 - low interest rate reaction -0.028 ***0.005 -0.010 * 0.076
 - high interest rate reaction -0.038 ***0.003




Panel B: Combined exchange rate and foreign interest rate reaction 
 
Countries classified as: β std error (1) (2) (3)
(1)       fixer
 - low exchange rate & high interest rate reaction -0.036 ***0.005
(2)       floater
 - high exchange rate & low interest rate reaction -0.029 ***0.006 0.48
(3)       dependent country
 - high exchange rate & high interest rate reaction -0.052 ***0.005 0.02 0.00
(4)       independent country
 - low exchange rate & low interest rate reaction -0.023 ***0.007 0.48 0.12 0.00
Parameter estimates Test for difference vs.
 
 
Note: The model estimates the effect of US monetary policy shocks on 50 unweighted country indices, 
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with Dt =1 if there was a relatively large exchange rate or foreign interest rate reaction in response to 
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where D
m are 0-1 dummies for D
1=1 if the reaction of the foreign interest rate of country i is large – i.e. 
larger than its median over the sample period – and its exchange rate response on that day is relatively 
small – again relative to its median reaction over the whole sample period; D
2=1 if the reaction of 
foreign interest rates is low and the exchange rate response on that day is relatively high; D
3=1 if the 
reaction of foreign interest rates is large and the exchange rate response on that day is relatively large; 
D
4=1 if the reaction of foreign interest rates is low and the exchange rate response on that day is small; 
and zero otherwise. The subscripts i,t indicate that the variable varies both over time and across 
countries, i.e. a country may not always belong to a single of these four groups, but may change its 
affiliation over time. “Test for difference” shows the significance level of tests for the null hypothesis 
that two respective coefficients are equal. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 
95% and 90% levels, respectively.   39
Table 8: The role of openness, the exchange rate and other macroeconomic 
variables 
 
βX std error (2) (3)
A.  OPENNESS
Capital account (1) closed -0.031 *** 0.008 0.200
(2) open -0.041 *** 0.007
Equity market (1) closed -0.001 0.012 0.001
(2) open -0.041 *** 0.007
Domestic financial (1) closed -0.010 0.012 0.012
sector (2) open -0.040 *** 0.006
Stock market (1) low -0.022 *** 0.008 0.003 0.006
capitalisation (2) medium -0.046 *** 0.008 0.764
(3) high -0.044 *** 0.007
B. EXCHANGE RATE
Volatility of effective (1) low -0.027 *** 0.007 0.284 0.001
exchange rate (2) medium -0.036 *** 0.008 0.020
(3) high -0.056 *** 0.008
Volatility vis-à-vis (1) low -0.027 *** 0.007 0.261 0.001
US dollar (2) medium -0.036 *** 0.008 0.019
(3) high -0.055 *** 0.008
Regime - de jure (1) fix -0.031 *** 0.007 0.333
(2) float -0.038 *** 0.007
C. OTHER
GDP correlation (1) low -0.026 *** 0.008 0.193 0.012
with US (2) medium -0.036 *** 0.007 0.098
(3) high -0.048 *** 0.008
Net indebtedness (1) low -0.041 *** 0.010 0.114 0.640
(2) medium -0.052 *** 0.010 0.099
(3) high -0.036 *** 0.006
Geographic distance (1) low -0.037 *** 0.007 0.389 0.679
(2) medium -0.032 *** 0.008 0.307





Note: The model estimates the effect of US monetary policy shocks on 50 unweighted country indices, 
testing for time heterogeneity and cross-sectional heterogeneity, as follows 
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where X
n are 0-1 dummies for X
low=1 if the respective variable Xi,t in country i at time t is in the lowest 
third compared to other countries respective value and over time; and analogously for X
mid and X
high. 
For the openness and exchange rate regime variables there are only two respective categories. Note that 
not all X are varying over time, but some are purely cross-sectional Xi, as discussed in the text. 
“Difference” shows the significance level of tests for the null hypothesis that two respective 
coefficients are equal. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively.   40
Table 9: The role of real and financial integration 
 
 
βX std error (2) (3)
A. WITH THE WORLD - ASSETS & LIABILITIES, IN- & OUTFLOWS
Total trade flows (1) low -0.024 *** 0.008 0.084 0.018
(2) medium -0.037 *** 0.007 0.191
(3) high -0.047 *** 0.008
Total capital stocks (1) low -0.018 ** 0.008 0.000 0.010
(2) medium -0.048 *** 0.008 0.518
(3) high -0.043 *** 0.008
   FDI (1) low -0.019 ** 0.008 0.001 0.003
(2) medium -0.045 *** 0.008 0.976
(3) high -0.045 *** 0.007
   Portfolio equity (1) low -0.024 *** 0.007 0.002 0.015
(2) medium -0.047 *** 0.007 0.490
(3) high -0.043 *** 0.007
   Portfolio debt (1) low -0.019 *** 0.007 0.000 0.013
(2) medium -0.051 *** 0.008 0.242
(3) high -0.042 *** 0.008
   Other investment (1) low -0.015 0.009 0.004 0.007
   loans (2) medium -0.048 *** 0.008 0.841
(3) high -0.046 *** 0.008
B. WITH THE UNITED STATES - ASSETS & LIABILITIES, IN- & OUTFLOWS
Total trade flows (1) low -0.031 *** 0.007 0.008 0.611
(2) medium -0.050 *** 0.008 0.015
(3) high -0.035 *** 0.007
Total capital stocks (1) low -0.047 *** 0.009 0.588 0.130
(2) medium -0.051 *** 0.009 0.018
(3) high -0.035 *** 0.006
   FDI (1) low -0.043 *** 0.008 0.652 0.281
(2) medium -0.039 *** 0.008 0.467
(3) high -0.035 *** 0.006
   Portfolio equity (1) low -0.035 *** 0.008 0.319 0.745
(2) medium -0.042 *** 0.008 0.107
(3) high -0.033 *** 0.006
   Portfolio debt (1) low -0.042 *** 0.009 0.204 0.312
(2) medium -0.049 *** 0.009 0.060
(3) high -0.034 *** 0.006
   Other investment (1) low -0.025 *** 0.008 0.002 0.034
   loans (2) medium -0.049 *** 0.008 0.243




Note: The model estimates the effect of US monetary policy shocks on 50 unweighted country indices, 
testing for time heterogeneity and cross-sectional heterogeneity, as follows 
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where X
n are 0-1 dummies for X
low=1 if the respective variable Xi,t in country i at time t is in the lowest 
third compared to other countries respective value and over time; and analogously for X
mid and X
high. 
Note that not all X are time-varying, but are cross-sectional Xi, as discussed in the text. “Difference” 
shows the significance level of tests for the null hypothesis that two respective coefficients are 
equal. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively.   41
Table 10: The role of real and financial integration with the US, separated into 
inflows and outflows or assets and liabilities 
 
βX std error (2) (3)
A.    FROM THE UNITED STATES
Trade (1) low -0.036 *** 0.009 0.610 0.530
(2) medium -0.033 *** 0.007 0.198
(3) high -0.042 *** 0.007
Total capital (1) low -0.038 *** 0.011 0.274 0.849
(2) medium -0.048 *** 0.009 0.120
(3) high -0.036 *** 0.006
   FDI (1) low -0.025 *** 0.009 0.056 0.115
(2) medium -0.044 *** 0.008 0.455
(3) high -0.039 *** 0.006
   Portfolio equity (1) low -0.033 *** 0.007 0.416 0.191
(2) medium -0.039 *** 0.007 0.558
(3) high -0.042 *** 0.007
   Portfolio debt (1) low -0.037 *** 0.009 0.193 0.909
(2) medium -0.046 *** 0.010 0.222
(3) high -0.036 *** 0.006
   Other investment (1) low -0.030 *** 0.010 0.550 0.265
   loans (2) medium -0.036 *** 0.008 0.468
(3) high -0.042 *** 0.007
B.   TO THE UNITED STATES
Trade (1) low -0.040 *** 0.009 0.700 0.750
(2) medium -0.037 *** 0.007 0.961
(3) high -0.037 *** 0.007
Total capital (1) low -0.051 *** 0.010 0.087 0.031
(2) medium -0.037 *** 0.008 0.663
(3) high -0.034 *** 0.006
   FDI (1) low -0.027 *** 0.008 0.003 0.240
(2) medium -0.051 *** 0.008 0.013
(3) high -0.036 *** 0.006
   Portfolio equity (1) low -0.044 *** 0.009 0.367 0.184
(2) medium -0.037 *** 0.008 0.672
(3) high -0.034 *** 0.005
   Portfolio debt (1) low -0.053 *** 0.009 0.315 0.000
(2) medium -0.045 *** 0.008 0.007
(3) high -0.027 *** 0.006
   Other investment (1) low -0.032 *** 0.008 0.120 0.546
   loans (2) medium -0.044 *** 0.007 0.244




Note: The model estimates the effect of US monetary policy shocks on 50 unweighted country indices, 
testing for time heterogeneity and cross-sectional heterogeneity, as follows 
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where X
n are 0-1 dummies for X
low=1 if the respective variable Xi,t in country i at time t is in the lowest 
third compared to other countries respective value and over time; and analogously for X
mid and X
high. 
Note that not all X are time-varying, but are cross-sectional Xi, as discussed in the text. “Difference” 
shows the significance level of tests for the null hypothesis that two respective coefficients are 
equal. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively.   42
Table 11: Transmission of US macroeconomic shocks 
 
Parameter estimates
Type of US shock: β std error
(1) Monetary policy -0.039 ***0.004
(2) Non-farm payroll employment -0.193 ***0.032
(3) NAPM / ISM confidence indicator 0.061 0.043
(4) CPI inflation -0.335 ***0.059
(5) PPI inflation -0.084 ***0.027
(6) GDP (advance release) 0.370 ***0.058
(7) Industrial production 0.064 * 0.038
(8) Retail sales -0.026 0.044
(9) Consumer confidence 0.130 0.092
(10) Trade balance 0.413 ***0.090
(11) Housing starts -0.071 0.051
(12) Hours worked per week -0.043 0.063
  
 
Note: The table shows the response of the equity return indices of 50 countries to US macroeconomic 
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with Mt as US macroeconomic surprises, St as the US monetary policy shocks, Zt the vector of the 
benchmark controls, and using country-fixed effects. The macroeconomic surprises capture the surprise 
component of the announcements, which is calculated as the difference between the announced value 
and the expected value, where the latter is measured as the median expectation in surveys conducted by 
Money Market Services (MMS) International. Sample: Daily data, February 1994 - December 2004 
(thus including 93 FOMC meetings). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% 
and 90% levels, respectively.   43
Table 12: US industrial production shocks – The role of openness, the exchange 
rate and other macroeconomic variables 
 
 
βX std error (2) (3)
A.  OPENNESS
Capital account (1) closed 0.097 0.090 0.729
(2) open 0.059 0.065
Equity market (1) closed 0.002 0.179 0.702
(2) open 0.074 0.056
Domestic financial (1) closed -0.130 0.166 0.207
sector (2) open 0.090 0.056
Stock market (1) low -0.033 0.095 0.893 0.029
capitalisation (2) medium -0.015 0.093 0.038
(3) high 0.235 *** 0.077
B. EXCHANGE RATE
Volatility of effective (1) low 0.038 0.093 0.972 0.478
exchange rate (2) medium 0.042 0.092 0.498
(3) high 0.125 ** 0.071
Volatility vis-à-vis (1) low 0.045 0.093 0.758 0.589
US dollar (2) medium 0.085 0.089 0.824
(3) high 0.112 0.081
Regime - de jure (1) fix 0.033 0.097 0.517
(2) float 0.109 * 0.065
C. OTHER
GDP correlation (1) low 0.098 0.097 0.728 0.927
with US (2) medium 0.050 0.098 0.770
(3) high 0.087 0.077
Net indebtedness (1) low 0.041 0.150 0.782 0.702
(2) medium -0.018 0.151 0.457
(3) high 0.102 * 0.057
Geographic distance (1) low 0.087 0.094 0.447 0.557
(2) medium -0.015 0.095 0.161





Note: The model estimates the effect of US industrial production shocks on 50 unweighted country 
indices, testing for time heterogeneity and cross-sectional heterogeneity, as follows 
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where X
n are 0-1 dummies for X
low=1 if the respective variable Xi,t in country i at time t is in the lowest 
third compared to other countries respective value and over time; and analogously for X
mid and X
high. 
For the openness and exchange rate regime variables there are only two respective categories. Note that 
not all X are varying over time, but some are purely cross-sectional Xi, as discussed in the text. 
“Difference” shows the significance level of tests for the null hypothesis that two respective 
coefficients are equal. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively.   44




βX std error (2) (3)
A. WITH THE WORLD - ASSETS & LIABILITIES, IN- & OUTFLOWS
Total trade flows (1) low -0.026 0.095 0.595 0.069
(2) medium 0.043 0.090 0.196
(3) high 0.198 ** 0.079
Total capital stocks (1) low -0.033 0.096 0.384 0.120
(2) medium 0.081 0.090 0.511
(3) high 0.160 ** 0.079
   FDI (1) low -0.030 0.095 0.353 0.108
(2) medium 0.091 0.090 0.516
(3) high 0.168 ** 0.079
   Portfolio equity (1) low 0.044 0.092 0.879 0.404
(2) medium 0.024 0.088 0.313
(3) high 0.150 * 0.088
   Portfolio debt (1) low 0.094 0.092 0.467 0.882
(2) medium 0.002 0.088 0.371
(3) high 0.113 0.088
   Other investment (1) low -0.094 0.100 0.085 0.052
   loans (2) medium 0.134 0.087 0.864
(3) high 0.154 ** 0.079
B. WITH THE UNITED STATES - ASSETS & LIABILITIES, IN- & OUTFLOWS
Total trade flows (1) low 0.051 0.096 0.573 0.275
(2) medium -0.025 0.094 0.084
(3) high 0.185 ** 0.077
Total capital stocks (1) low 0.098 0.151 0.656 0.981
(2) medium 0.003 0.148 0.569
(3) high 0.094 0.057
   FDI (1) low 0.056 0.099 0.715 0.456
(2) medium 0.005 0.097 0.242
(3) high 0.147 ** 0.073
   Portfolio equity (1) low 0.096 0.099 0.557 0.766
(2) medium 0.180 * 0.103 0.341
(3) high 0.059 0.074
   Portfolio debt (1) low -0.040 0.152 0.238 0.435
(2) medium 0.204 0.139 0.443
(3) high 0.088 0.060
   Other investment (1) low 0.077 0.095 0.589 0.652
   loans (2) medium 0.005 0.094 0.300




Note: The model estimates the effect of US industrial production shocks on 50 unweighted country 
indices, testing for time heterogeneity and cross-sectional heterogeneity, as follows 
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where X
n are 0-1 dummies for X
low=1 if the respective variable Xi,t in country i at time t is in the lowest 
third compared to other countries respective value and over time; and analogously for X
mid and X
high. 
Note that not all X are time-varying, but are cross-sectional Xi, as discussed in the text. “Difference” 
shows the significance level of tests for the null hypothesis that two respective coefficients are 
equal. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. CESifo Working Paper Series 
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